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strued,45 adhere to the cardinal rule of statutory construction that
statutes be given a reasonable interpretation that will effectuate
legislative intent.4 6 Thus, there is really no difference in result between
a strict and liberal interpretation. Before Nepstad the Supreme Court
of South Dakota not only declared the guest statute's purpose to be
to abolish or minimize collusion against liability insurers, 47 but also
favored a liberal interpretation to effectuate the legislative intent.48
The majority opinion in Nepstad disregards this prior interpretation.
It appears that the court in Nepstad has disregarded several of the
fundamental rules of statutory construction in holding its guest statute
inapplicable. With the growing use of motor driven golf carts and
other non-highway vehicles, actions arising from circumstances sim-
ilar to those in Nepstad may be expected to increase. Absent explicit
language or more convincing reasons than those contained in Nepstad
the location of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident should
not be controlling in determining guest statute applicability.
HARRY C. ROBERTS, JR.
FUTURE IRREPARABLE HARM: A GROUND FOR
RELEASE IN FEDERAL EXTRADITION
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
The Federal Constitution provides that when a person who has
been charged with a crime in one state flees to another state, the
executive authority of the state in which the fugitive has sought
asylum shall, upon demand, deliver him up to the first state.1 Accord-
'Harrell v. Gardner, 115 Ga. App. 171, 154 S.E.2d 265 (1967); State v. Taylor,
49 Hawaii 624, 425 P.2d 1014 (1967); Mahney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426
P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967).
"'Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, 254 Iowa 470, 117 N.W.2d goo (1962); Lloyd v. Runge,
186 Kan. 54, 348 P.2d 594 (196o); Cappellano v. Pane, 178 Neb. 493, 134 N.W.2d
76 (1965); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1959);
Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d lO (1947), afJ'd, 149 Ohio St.
500, 79 N.E.2d 9o6 (1948); Peterson v. Snell, 8o S.D. 496, 127 N.W.2d 142 (1964);
Schlim v. Gau, 8o S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174 (1963); Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah
2d lo6, 404 P.2d 972 (1965); Jensen v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956).
4
7Kilgore v. U-Drive-It Co., 149 Ohio St. 505, 19 N.E.2d 9o8 (1948); Kitchens
v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d 1o (1947), afj'd, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79
N.E.2d 9o6 (1948).
"8Peterson v. Snell, 8o S.D. 496, 127 N.W.2d 142 (1964); Schlim v. Gau, 8o S.D.
403, 125 N.W.2d 174 (1963).
1U. S. Const. art. IV, § 2. This constitutional mandate has been codified by
statute which provides that upon production of an authentic indictment or affi-
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ingly, all jurisdictions have statutes outlining the procedure for inter-
state rendition of fugitives.2 A fugitive who wishes to contest the
rendition order can appeal in the state courts of the asylum state;3
if unsuccessful, he may then seek federal habeas corpus relief there.4
Traditionally, a federal court's scope of inquiry in such habeas corpus
cases has been limited to a determinaion of whether the extradition
request is in order.5 This inquiry involves only three questions: (1)
whether a crime has been charged under the laws of the demanding
state; (2) whether the fugitive in custody is in fact the person charged;
and (3) whether the fugitive was in the demanding state at the time
the alleged crime was committed.6 The inquiry has been so limited
even where the fugitive has alleged that he will be subjected to irrepar-
able harm if he is returned to the demanding state.7
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan recently
departed from tradition and made a full inquiry into the allegations
of prospective irreparable harm in In re Hunt,8 where habeas corpus
relief was sought to defeat extradition to Arizona, the demanding
state. While awaiting retrial on charges of assault and battery, peti-
davit by the executive authority of the demanding state charging the person
demanded with having committed a felony or other crime, the executive authority
of the asylum state shall cause said person to be delivered up to an authorized
agent of the demanding state. x8 U.S.C. § 3182 (1964).
2The procedure for interstate rendition of fugitives was established in the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act of 1936 which, as of 1965, had been adopted
by all jurisdictions except Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Washington, and the District of Columbia. See, e.g., 25 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
28.1285(1)-(31) (1954). Those states which have not adopted the Act, however, do
have similar extradition statutes. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 3981 (1942); D.C.
CODE § 23-401 (1967).
3Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 8o, 94 (1885); Robb v. Connolly, I11 U.S. 624,
637 (1884). See 25 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1285(9) (1954).
'Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 8o, 94 (1885); see 31 Am. JUR. 2d Extradition
§ 64 (1967).
55 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 483 (1957).
GId.
7Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432 (1914); United States ex rel. Tucker v. Donovan,
321 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1963); Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Person v. Morrow, 1o8 F.2d 838 (ioth Cir. 1940); Kyles v. Preston, 253 F. Supp.
628 (D.D.C. 1966).
State courts similarly limit their inquiry. E.g., Chase v. State, .93 Fla. 963,
113 So. 103 (1927); Commonwealth ex rel. Flower v. Superintendent of Philadelphia
County Prison, 220 Pa. 401, 69 A. 916 (19o8); Ex parte Massee, 95 S.C. 315, 79 S.E.
97 (1913); State ex rel. Lea v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S.W.2d 841 (1933).
8276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
Petitioner had originally been convicted of assault and battery and contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor in Arizona. On appeal the conviction was
reversed and the cause remanded for new -trial. Pending the second trial,
petitioner was freed on appeal bond and subsequently left the jurisdiction. 276 F.
Supp. at 113.
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tioner left Arizona and established residence in Michigan. Arizona's
attempts to secure petitioner's presence for trial were unsuccessful so
extradition papers were forwarded to the Governor of Michigan.
However, Arizona did not wait for the results of the extradition hear-
ing in Michigan but proceeded to convict the petitioner of the offenses
charged in an in absentia proceeding lo Subsequent to that proceeding
Michigan notified Arizona that its rendition request would be honor-
ed. 1 Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed the rendition order in the
Michigan state courts and then petitioned for federal habeas corpus
relief in the Michigan federal district court. The question presented
was whether the court might examine the extradition proceeding to
see if it would result in irreparable harm to the petitioner or whether
such inquiry was foreclosed if the extradition request were found to
be in order.
The district court recognized the traditional limitation on the
scope of inquiry in federal extradition habeas corpus proceedings.
12
However, it noted that recent Supreme Court decisions in every area
of criminal law and procedure have emphasized the vindication of
individual rights. 1 3 Therefore, upon finding that the Arizona in
'°Arizona Rule 231 which authorizes the in absentia proceeding provides:
A. In a prosecution for a felony the defendant shall be present:
I. At arraignment.
2. When a plea of guilty is made.
3. At the calling, examination, challenging, impaneling and swearing
of the jury.
4. At all proceedings before the court when the jury is present.
5. When the evidence is addressed to the court out of the presence of
the jury for the purpose of laying the foundation for the introduction
of the evidence before the jury.
6. At a view by the jury.
7. At the rendition of the verdict.
B. If the defendant is voluntarily absent, the proceedings provided by this
rule, except in paragraphs I and 2 of subsection A, may be had in his
absence if the court so orders.
ARIZ. S. CT. (CRIM.) R. 231.
"The petitioner had contended that the extradition request should not be
honored since she now stood convicted rather than charged in Arizona and
Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution uses only the term "charged." The district
court rejected this contention since the Governor's extradition hearing took
cognizance of the change in the petitioner's status and the hearing was conducted
in light thereof.
'1The court cited Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); Sweeney v. Woodall,
344 U.S. 86 (1952). See text accompanying notes 5 and 6 supra.
"3As examples the court cited In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967); Brookhart v.
Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (ig6i). Particular emphasis was
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absentia proceeding violated the petitioner's federal constitutional
rights and that the petitioner had not made an effective waiver of these
rights,14 the court felt compelled to abandon precedent and inquire
into the future plight of the petitioner. The court noted that it would
be a matter of months, and perhaps years, before petitioner would
be able to appeal her conviction through the Arizona state courts and
that even if admitted to bail, she would not have the "freedom of
action enjoyed by a citizen not so beclouded"1 5 by a prior conviction.
This inhibition on freedom of action was found to be an irreparable
injury. Accordingly, the court granted the writ and ruled that the
petitioner be returned to Arizona only upon the condition that she
get a new trial.
The question of the scope of inquiry into future irreparable harm
in extradition habeas corpus proceedings has generally been raised by
escaped prisoners who have claimed that they would be subjected to
cruel and inhuman punishment by the prison officials of the demand-
ing state if forced to return. 16 The leading authority is Sweeney v.
placed on Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), where the Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, required as a prerequisite to federal
habeas corpus relief, applied only -to those remedies still open to the petitioner at
the time petition was made for federal habeas corpus relief.
"The rights found to have been violated by the in absentia proceeding were
presence at trial, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and effective
assistance of counsel. Also, the court found that under the circumstances, peti-
tioner's voluntary absence from trial did not constitute an effective waiver of
rights. 276 F. Supp. at 120. This comment assumes these findings are correct and
deals only with the extradition issue.
5276 F. Supp. at 121.
"6E.g., Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952); Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S.
63 (19o9); Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 862 (1951); Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 941 (1951); Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 195o) , cert.
denied, 340 U.s. 828 (1950); United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 181 F.2d 588
(2d Cir. 195o); cert. denied, 339 U.S. 980 (195o). Gerrish v. New Hampshire, 97
F. Supp. 527 (D. Me. 1951); Ex parte Marshall, 85 F. Supp. 771 (D. N.J. 1949).
Frequently, when state prisoners have sought habeas corpus relief on grounds of
mistreatment, the writ has been denied unless the prisoner would be entitled
to absolute release if his claims were proved. This result is based on the theory
that the function of habeas corpus is not to correct a practice but rather to
provide a remedy for unlawful detention. Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d
640 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988 (195o). That is, it was often thought
that habeas corpus is a remedy which offers only complete relief or nothing.
See Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 985, ioo6 (1962). However, the modern trend seems to be that there are
other forms of relief than complete release. See Dowd v. United States ex rel.
Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944); In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848,
372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 914 (1962).
1968]
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Woodall,17 where future cruel and inhuman treatment was alleged
by an escaped convict who sought to defeat his extradition from Ohio
to Alabama. The Supreme Court denied the writ, saying that both
the scheme of interstate rendition and considerations fundamental to
our federal system demanded the prompt return of the fugitive to
the demanding state (Alabama) and required that the alleged un-
constitutional treatment be tested there.
The traditional limitation on the scope of inquiry in federal habeas
corpus proceedings, manifest in Sweeney, is consistent with the prin-
ciple of comity which has always required an exhaustion of state
remedies as a prerequisite to any federal habeas corpus relief.ls In
the extradition context, comity has required that the courts of the
demanding state be given the first opportunity to pass upon alleged
denials of constitutional rights within their jurisdiction.19 Consequ-
ently, both prior and subsequent to Sweeney, the overwhelming ma-
jority of federal courts has refused to hear allegations of unconstitu-
tional treatment suffered in the demanding state when remedies had
not been exhausted in that state.
20
1 344 U.S. 86 (1952).18Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). The exhaustive doctrine of Hawk was
later codified:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section,
if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) (1948 version), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966).
"Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 3o8 (9 th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
862 (ig5).
'E.g., Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); United States ex rel. Vitiello v.
Flood, 374 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1967); Smith v. Idaho, 373 F.2d 149 (9 th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 919 (1967); Malory v. McGettrick, 318 F.2d 816 (6th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 935 (1963); Brown v. Ward, 275 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir.
196o); Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 941
(1g51); United States ex rel. Brown v. Cooke, 20o9 F. 607 (3d Cir. 1913); Cohen v.
Warden, 252 F. Supp. 666 (D. Md. 1966); United States ex rel. Proctor v. New
York, 229 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Contra, Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250
(3 d Cir. 1949), revld per curiam, 338 U.S. 864 (1949). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals granted the writ to the petitioner in Dye based on substantial evidence
of past mistreatment by Georgia prison officials. The court reasoned that the
doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies did not apply to extradition cases. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court was presented with the precise question of the appli-
cation of the exhaustion of state remedies rule to the extradition context. How-
1968] CASE COMMENTS 305
The argument against Sweeney is that the doctrine of federalism,
which is designed to promote efficacy between the states, should not
bar federal habeas corpus relief where fundamental, constitutionally
guaranteed rights are subject to being jeopardized in the demanding
state.21 The feeling is that when the concept of federalism and the
fundamental rights of the individual petitioner are drawn in con-
flict, greater weight should be afforded the latter.22 However, most
cases have rejected this argument without comment.23 One basis for the
rejection is that there is no justification for assuming that the demand-
ing state will unlawfully prevent the petitioner from testing his claim
of unconstitutional treatment in the local and state or federal courts. 24
The Supreme Court has not been presented with the precise ques-
tion of the scope of inquiry into alleged irreparable harm in an extra-
dition habeas corpus case since Sweeney in 1952. But, in 1963 a new
element to the federal-state balance applicable to habeas corpus cases
in general was added by the Court in Fay v. Noia.25 Noia was a non-
extradition case in which the petitioner was convicted of murder and
then sentenced to life imprisonment after remarks by the trial judge
indicating that the petitioner was lucky not to have received the death
ever, the Court declined to answer the question fully, for in its per curiam
reversal of Dye, the Court cited only Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). Hawk,
a non-extradition case, held that all state remedies must be exhausted as a pre-
requisite to federal habeas corpus relief. Thus, it was not clear whether the
exhaustion doctrine would require an extraditee to go through the courts of two
states before seeking federal habeas corpus relief. The formal proposition that
habeas corpus tests only the legality of the present detention in the asylum
state leads to the conclusion that only the remedies in the asylum state must
be exhausted. However, Sweeney clearly requires that alleged violations of consti-
tutional rights in the demanding state must be raised in the courts of that state
before federal habeas corpus relief will be granted.
"Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 91 (1952) (dissenting opinion); Johnson
v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 195o) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
340 U-S. 828 (1950); Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd per curiam,
338 U.S. 864 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Baldi, 378 Pa. 504, lo6 A.2d
777, 781 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superin-
tendent of County Prisons, 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A.2d 576 (1943).
-2Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950). See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 91 (1952)
(dissenting opinion); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Baldi, 378 Pa. 504, io6 A.2d
777, 781 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
2E.g., Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 3o8 (gth Cir. 1951), ceit. denied, 342
U.S. 862 (1951); United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 18x F.2d 588 (2d Cir.
195o), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 98o (1950); United States ex rel. Proctor v. New
York, 229 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
2 'Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 90 (1952) (concurring opinion); Johnson
v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950);
see Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909).
2'372 U.S. 391 (1963)-
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sentence. Because of these remarks Noia was afraid of receiving the
death sentence upon retrial and did not exhaust the available state
appellate remedies within the statutory time. Subsequently, he filed
for habeas corpus relief on the ground that his conviction was based
on a coerced confession. The Supreme Court held that the exhaustion
of state remedies doctrine applied only to those remedies still avail-
able at the time petition was made for habeas corpus relief.2 Since
petitioner's remedies were no longer available, he could properly
seek federal habeas corpus relief. The Court concluded that only
where there has been a deliberate by-passing of state remedies should
the federal court deny habeas corpus relief.27
In re Hunt relied upon a broad interpretation of Noia to justi-
fy its departure from Sweeney even though Noia was not an extradi-
tion case. No other extradition case even mentions Noia2s and it may
well be argued that the Noia exhaustion of state remedies rule is
inapplicable to the extradition situation. Denial of habeas corpus
relief in the non-extradition case leaves the petitioner without any
state remedies. But denial of relief in the extradition context does no
more than authorize the petitioner's return to the demanding state
where he may pursue available state and federal remedies. Also, the
Court in Noia clearly stated that it did not intend to disturb the ex-
haustion of remedies rule where there are presently available reme-
dies.
29
Notwithstanding this argument, In re Hunt applied Noia to the
extradition situation, concluding that Noia went beyond the exhaus-
tion rule and did more than just provide a remedy for the petitioner
who had none other available at the time his petition for federal
habeas corpus relief was filed. Noia was interpreted as giving federal
courts a broad power to grant habeas corpus relief to any petitioner in
any habeas corpus proceeding when it is found that the denial of such
relief would work irreparable harm.30
'372 U.S. at 399.
27372 U.S. at 438.
2The extradition cases since Noia have ignored Noia and have followed
Sweeney or its reasoning. E.g., United States ex rel. Vitiello v. Flood, 374 F.2d
554 (2d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Tucker v. Donovan, 321 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 977 (1964); Malory v. McGettrick, 318 F.2d 816
(6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 935 (1963); United States ex rel. Proctor v.
New York, 229 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
2372 U.S. at 435 n.3.
• The court in Hunt felt that Noia "was intended to strike down much of
the prior law accommodating state criminal process to the doctrine of federal-
ism...", and that it was no longer necessary to follow the Sweeney doctrine.
276 F. Supp. at 117.
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Accordingly, under the Hunt interpretation of Noia, a federal
court sitting in the asylum state can, for the first time, go beyond the
traditionally limited scope of inquiry (i.e., determining only whether
the extradition request is in order) and inquire into the petitioner's
allegations of future irreparable harm. Hunt, therefore, has adopted
the frequently argued policy that rights of the individual should pre-
vail over considerations of comity and federalism.31
Followers of the Sweeney doctrine might argue that a willingness
to grant habeas corpus relief upon allegations of future irreparable
harm in the demanding state will have the effect of placing judicial
approval on acts of jail-breaking and bail-jumping.32 They might
also argue that demanding states will be put to the expense and in-
convenience of sending representatives to any of the forty-nine other
states to defend charges of alleged constitutional violations.33 While
there is some merit to these arguments, it should be noted that it was
against just such considerations as these that Noia made a policy de-
cision in favor of protecting the rights of the individual. Futhermore,
it appears that these arguments are somewhat exaggerated. To begin
with, the petitioner has an extremely difficult burden of proof in show-
ing a denial of his rights and resulting future harm.3 4 And, for relief to
be granted, the future harm must be truly irreparable.35 Consequently,
there would be little encouragement to become a fugitive for pur-
poses of seeking habeas corpus relief in an asylum state. Secondly, a
state which does deny, irreparably, a petitioner's constitutional rights
should not be heard to complain of any litigation expenses incurred
as a result.
The only apparent danger of allowing broad inquiry in extradition
habeas corpus is that the courts might grant relief on a showing of
future harm which is less than irreparable. Such leniency could, as
'E.g., Sweeney v. Woodall, S44 U.S. 86, 90 (1952) (concurring opinion); John-
son v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828
(195o); see Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909).
lKyles v. Preston, 253 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1966).
'Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 195o), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
828 (1950).
'Smith v. Idaho, 373 F.2d 149, 156 (gth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
919 (1967). In addition to the difficulty of proving some basis for his claim of
past mistreatment which may have encouraged his escape (i.e., his evidence of
such mistreatment will normally be limited to his own personal scars, other
escaped prisoner's testimony, or other evidence of equally dubious value), the
prisoner must convince the court that his prediction of the future is accurate-
"a bard burden even in the ordinary case." Note, Extradition Habeas Corpus,
74 YALE L.J. 78, 128 n. 207 (1964).
It is clear in Hunt that future harm must be irreparable before relief can
be granted. 276 F. Supp. at 117, 12-1.
1968]
